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HOBBY LOBBY: ITS FLAWED INTERPRETIVE TECHNIQUES
AND STANDARDS OF APPLICATION
Kent Greenawalt*
INTRODUCTION
At the end of June 2014, the Supreme Court decided one of the
most publicized controversies of decades. In a decision covering two
cases, widely referred to as Hobby Lobby,1 the Court held that closely held
for-proﬁt corporations, based on their owners’ religious convictions, have
a right under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)2 to decline
to provide employees with insurance that covers contraceptive devices
that may prevent a fertilized egg “from developing any further by
inhibiting its attachment to the uterus.”3
The result has been widely approved by those who favor an extensive
scope for religious liberty and strongly criticized by others who worried
that it will undermine basic concerns about equality for women and nondiscrimination based on sexual orientation.4 Among other effects, it has
sharply intensiﬁed both efforts to enact new state laws like RFRA and the
opposition to such efforts.
The focus of this Essay is not upon whether the result itself is on
balance justiﬁed, which I urge is indeed a close question. Rather, it
describes and criticizes the basic approach to interpretation and the
standards adopted by the Court’s majority. It examines in successive Parts
the Court’s treatment of the relevant statutory criteria, offering some
critiques that, as construed, their effectiveness is sharply curtailed. But
the overarching theme is that these standards should not have been
addressed wholly independently of each other, but with consideration of
how together they can accomplish what the statute aims to do.
*. University Professor, Columbia Law School.
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).
3. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2762–63. Relatively recent evidence indicates that one of
the four devices, Plan B, may not have this effect. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus
of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes
Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 1417, 1456–57 (2012) (noting “while Plan
B appears to have no effect after fertilization, . . . post-fertilization effects cannot be
deﬁnitively ruled out”).
4. Among those who believe the decision was sound is Paul Horwitz, The Hobby
Lobby Moment, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 154, 157 n.16 (2014) (“In short, I think the Court was
right in Hobby Lobby.”). Among the critics is Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious
Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 Harv. J.L. & Gender 35, 35 (2015) (asserting
“grounds for deep skepticism of any sweeping regime of religious exemptions”).
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Of course, a realist perspective suggests that what is articulated in a
majority opinion does not necessarily accurately describe how the
Supreme Court Justices have reached a conclusion; but as outsiders, that is
what we have to assess matters, at least until decades later when internal
documents may be made public.5 Moreover, if one believes it is desirable
for opinions generally to be candid about how judges reach conclusions,
that also provides an important reason to focus on what opinions say.
RFRA constitutes a very unusual statutory provision. In order to
reject the Supreme Court’s curtailment, in Employment Division v. Smith,6
of the extensive free exercise protection provided by rulings in the
preceding three decades, Congress explicitly adopted what it conceived
to be the appropriate constitutional standard.7 Although the Court subsequently ruled that the law did not validly apply to states, the essential
standard remains as enacted for federal law.8 Given all this, how to
construe and apply this law’s language involves a rather strange combination of statutory and constitutional interpretation.9
The overall themes of both this Essay and those volumes is that basic
approaches to interpretations are not simple nor should they be, despite
the assertions in many opinions of Supreme Court Justices and some
scholarly writing that suggest otherwise.10 The nature of particular provisions and the subjects they cover are elements of context that need to
be taken into account. Often, components that may be articulated as
distinct should be related to each other in their application.11 With many
standards of application that courts may or may not choose to adopt, a
crucial consideration can be their administrability. How easily can
officials, lower court judges, and perhaps juries, apply those standards in
a variety of instances that will arise?
5. For a treatment on this uncertainty about opinions, written to satisfy Justices who
may have different perspectives and to put determinations as more obvious than they really
are, see generally Kent Greenawalt, Statutory and Common Law Interpretation (2013)
[hereinafter Greenawalt, Statutory]; Kent Greenawalt, Interpreting the Constitution (2015)
[hereinafter Greenawalt, Interpreting].
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5), (b)(1) (adopting compelling interest standard as
test applicable to free exercise claims); S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 2–3 (1993) (same).
8. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439
(2006) (holding RFRA valid as applied to federal law); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 534–35 (1997) (holding RFRA invalid with regard to state law).
9. For a lengthier discussion of these subjects, see generally Greenawalt, Statutory,
supra note 5; Greenawalt, Interpreting, supra note 5.
10. See supra note 5 (citing author’s previous work on uncertainty of opinions).
11. A simple example of this is “probable cause” that someone has committed a
crime, needed for an arrest; “probable” here depends not only on the degree of
likelihood of criminal behavior but also on the gravity of a crime and the likelihood that
the individual who may have committed it will be able to escape altogether if not stopped
now. See Greenawalt, Interpreting, supra note 5, at 315–19 (exploring Court’s treatment
of probable cause and highlighting problems implicating “extent to which judges should
employ general categorical standards or undertake particular evaluations”).
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The Essay’s fundamental contentions are that Justice Alito’s opinion in
Hobby Lobby adopts an approach that is excessively formalistic, that it treats as
separate certain elements of the statute that should be seen as interrelated,
and that it takes inadequate account of concerns about administrability.
This Essay begins with a detached description of what the case
involved and what the various opinions of the Justices actually assert. This
descriptions is largely aimed to provide readers who are not already
closely familiar with those opinions with a basis to assess the fairness of
the main critique offered here.
The two families controlling the companies involved in Hobby
Lobby possess religious convictions that once an egg is fertilized, it is a
human life that deserves protection and therefore, when emergency contraceptives operate after fertilization, they constitute a kind of abortion.12
Based on their convictions against providing insurance that assists this
way of causing wrongful death, the company owners sought an exemption from the requirement of regulations issued under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA), and as part of the
2011 Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, which required employee
insurance to cover such contraception, as well as all the other sixteen
forms of contraception approved by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).13 The Supreme Court held that RFRA afforded the companies
their claimed right.14
To reach that result, the Justices had to resolve at least three of four
issues set by RFRA favorably for the companies: (1) They had to decide
that the statutory protection includes closely held for-proﬁt corporations,
and does so even if the law from which the exemption is sought is
designed to protect their workers, many of whom will not share the
owners’ religious convictions; (2) the Justices also had to ﬁnd the
“substantial burden” on religious exercise, needed to qualify for a RFRA
exemption; and (3) they further had to determine either that the government lacked a compelling interest behind its regulation or (4) had failed
to employ an available “less restrictive means” to achieve its objective.15
Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion and Justice Kennedy added a
relatively brief concurrence. Justice Alito’s opinion is an interesting
mixture of rather broad propositions underlying a holding that is quite
narrow. Especially since Justice Kennedy’s concurrence indicates that he
12. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2766 (2014).
13. Id. at 2765.
14. Id. at 2785.
15. On the available means, the Justices focused on the Department of Health and
Human Services’ delayed accommodation that already speciﬁed that religious nonproﬁt
organizations did not need to provide such insurance directly—although insurance
companies, either providing group insurance or engaged by third-party administrators for
organizations giving self-insurance, did have to ﬁnance use of these contraceptives.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781–82 (2014). That established a
less restrictive means that could be extended to closely held for-proﬁt corporations. Id.
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might not accept giving an expansive scope of protection to for-proﬁt
corporations, one cannot easily foresee actual future outcomes, even prior
to a change in the Court’s composition. What well may be even more
important, and equally hard to predict, is the range of claims companies
will make for exemptions, and how all this will affect political controversies
about the appropriateness of special exemptions for those with religious
convictions. The country has moved from a broad acceptance of religious
exemptions to a perception by many that they tend to conﬂict with the
rights of women and of gay individuals and couples; and recent proposals
to enact state RFRAs have been claimed to reﬂect a hostility to equal
treatment for same-sex marriage.16 By extending the range of exemptions
in a decidedly controversial setting, Hobby Lobby has intensiﬁed resistance
to religious exemptions more broadly.17
Justice Alito’s opinion provides a striking example of a particular
approach to statutory interpretation. Although quite acceptable in many
straightforward cases, that approach is genuinely misguided in this
particular setting. The approach is predominantly formalistic, treating
each of the four issues separately as if they lack intrinsic connection. When
resolving each issue in order, Justice Alito disregarded many considerations that could bear on overall application. A consequence is that RFRA
is read to provide a clear answer that it does not actually contain. The
opinion pays virtually no attention to whether its announced legal
standards may entail sacriﬁces of workers’ legitimate interests and produce
serious problems of administrability, leading to the granting of various
claimed concessions that are really beyond what the statute covers.
Among the particular analytic problems with the majority opinion is
its carving out of the crucial tax case of United States v. Lee.18 As explained
16. See Michael Paulson & Fernanda Santos, Religious Right in Arizona Cheers Bill
Allowing Businesses to Refuse to Serve Gays, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/us/religious-right-in-arizona-cheers-bill-allowing-businesses-torefuse-to-serve-gays.html?_r=0 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing controversy around Arizona legislators’ attempt to enact state RFRA); see also Joshua Dorner, Ctr.
for Am. Progress, Religious Liberty for Some or Religious Liberty for All? 6–7 (2013),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ReligiousLiberty.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9Lm3-8VF4] (discussing severe consequences of religious exemptions
for women, same-sex individuals and couples, and families generally). But see Ryan T.
Anderson & Leslie Ford, Protecting Religious Liberty in the State Marriage Debate,
Backgrounder (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 10, 2014, at 1–2, http://thf
_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/pdf/BG2891.pdf (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(disputing idea that religious exemptions infringe on “sexual freedoms”).
17. Paul Horwitz has offered an account of the breakdown of a relative consensus on
religious liberty and exemptions in The Hobby Lobby Moment. Horwitz, supra note 4, at
166–84. Elizabeth Sepper has responded that the lack of consensus is speciﬁcally about
corporate exemptions, particularly those that impose signiﬁcant costs on third parties.
Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated,
128 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 24, 25–28 (2014), http://harvardlawreview.org/2014/11/reportsof-accommodations-death-have-been-greatly-exaggerated/ [http://perma.cc/9NSN-WUHZ].
18. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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later, the paying of taxes for a particular purpose to which one strongly
objects bears much more resemblance to insurance coverage that may be
used in part for behavior one regards as immoral than Justice Alito
acknowledges.
As already noted, the particular controversy Hobby Lobby presented
could fairly have been resolved either way. Taken alone, this isolated
granting of an exemption seems acceptable, but the Court’s decision
raises deep problems about general propositions and future applications.
Although the dissenters may have been correct that RFRA should not
have applied here, what this Essay urges is that the legitimate aspects that
needed to be taken into account are considerably more complex and
interrelated than the majority opinion indicates. Although readers can
never be sure how far the somewhat artiﬁcial, legalistic reasoning in
opinions represents the bases on which Justices actually reach their
conclusions,19 identifying crucial ﬂaws remains important. This Essay
emphasizes what should have counted but was not reﬂected in Justice
Alito’s opinion.
To be clear, most of this Essay’s criticisms do not cover typical issues of
statutory interpretation, in which judges apply speciﬁc detailed language
that clearly does or does not reach particular circumstances, thereby
reﬂecting both what legislators intended and what knowledgeable readers
would understand. Being vague and open-ended and built on prior free
exercise law, RFRA is different. It is a kind of framework statute, requiring
more complex reasoning and assessments of competing considerations.
One cannot genuinely discern a clear original understanding of the
statute’s application in the novel setting of this case. When determining
outcomes and standards in such situations, judges should be guided substantially by what will work effectively, given the underlying values of the
statute before them. That RFRA was designed to reinstate a prior constitutional approach provides a special reason for interpretation here to
resemble that of the Constitution’s broad provisions.
This Essay ﬁrst addresses some major concerns about the scope of
RFRA. It then turns to application of each of the law’s standards. Part II
examines RFRA’s application to closely held corporations. Part III
addresses the question of whether requiring insurance coverage for
19. On this question, it may well be relevant that all of the ﬁve Justices in the
majority, except Justice Kennedy, embraced Justice Scalia’s explicitly formalistic, textcentered approach in NLRB v. Canning, issued just days before Hobby Lobby. NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Canning strongly
rejects Justice Breyer’s emphasis, in writing for the majority, on what will work effectively,
and on historical practice, in determining whether a President can make recess
appointments during intrasession recesses and for vacancies that occur prior to the recess
but continue into it. Id. at 2592–618 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Because all
the Justices agreed that appointments cannot be made during very brief intra-sessions
recesses of the kind the actual case involved, Justice Scalia’s opinion, in sharp
disagreement with Justice Breyer, was one concurring in the judgment. Id. at 2592 (Scalia,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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employees to use the four contraceptive devices constituted a “substantial
burden” on the owners’ exercise of religion. Because the Court found a
substantial burden, Part IV analyzes Justice Alito’s consideration of
whether the government has a “compelling interest” in requiring the
contested insurance coverage. Finally, Part V examines the issue of
whether denial of an exemption was the least restrictive means. For all
these Parts, it is critical to keep in mind the central claim that each of the
law’s standards should not have been treated in isolation.
I. ISSUES ABOUT THE SCOPE OF RFRA
The initial question in Hobby Lobby involved the scope of RFRA and
whether it extended to closely held for-proﬁt organizations. The law
provides that the “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability.”20 Strongly supported by a wide range of religious and civil
liberties organizations, and adopted by a Senate vote of 97-3 and a House
voice vote reﬂecting virtually no opposition, the law’s stated objective, as
already noted, was to reestablish the free exercise law that Employment
Division v. Smith had rejected.21 Contrary to earlier decisions, Smith had
concluded that no valid constitutional claim can be made by those whose
religious exercise is impaired by a general law not itself directed against
religion.22 The Court thus rejected the free exercise claim of two
members of the Native American Church who had used peyote as the
central part of their worship services and were then ﬁred for doing so.23
The two Native American Church members had been refused unemployment compensation because their ﬁring was for violating a criminal
statute not directed at religious practice.24 By enacting RFRA, Congress
aimed to reinstate the First Amendment law that preceded Smith, which
would have supported the claim in Smith unless the government had a
“compelling interest” that could not be satisﬁed by a less restrictive
means. According to the Senate Report, RFRA’s purpose was “only to
overturn the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.”25 Provisions of the
statute itself say that its objective was to “restore the compelling interest
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012).
21. Id. § 2000bb(a)(4)–(5), (b); see also Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting
Religious Practices, N.Y. Times (Nov. 17, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/17
/us/clinton-signs-law-protecting-religious-practices.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing both “unusual coalition of liberal, conservative and religious groups
that had pressed for the new law” and bill’s approval process).
22. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82
(1990) (declining to extend constitutional protections to religiously motivated action in
circumstances that do not involve “Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections”).
23. Id. at 890.
24. Id. at 874.
25. S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 2–3 (1993).
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test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder,”26 and they
characterize the “compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal
court rulings . . . [as] a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.”27
In grasping the core grounds for both Employment Division v. Smith and
Congress’s RFRA response, one question is critical: Whenever claims for
exemptions are based on the magnitude and intensity of religious
convictions, or conscience more generally, how can administrators and
judges discern whether someone really meets the standards? The easiest
circumstances are when no one has an incentive to make a claim
insincerely. Also simple are claims by persons who are clearly aligned with a
religious denomination that has settled standards, such as an Orthodox
Jewish prisoner who refuses to eat pork. Harder situations arise when other
people have unrelated reasons to avoid legal obligations and those making
claims are not relying on standard church doctrines, as was true for many
who claimed conscientious objections to military service. In such circumstances, the government may then attempt a serious inquiry into convictions or grant claims generally. Either approach allows some claimants
who do not genuinely meet the basic standards to succeed. Smith reﬂected
the view that these matters were too complicated to generate a constitutional right to exemption; RFRA was based on the contrary conclusion,
at least for the kinds of situations courts had dealt with prior to Smith. What
RFRA by itself does not tell us is exactly when, in light of these
administrative difficulties, the value of conceding adherence to religious
convictions is insufficiently great to warrant including entities as legitimate
claimants. Nor does the statute make clear whether, when not excluding
particular claimants, these difficulties should yield to judges applying
“substantial burden,” “compelling interest,” and “least restrictive means”
in a way that is deferential to government decisions, in order to avoid
excessively broad coverage and serious problems of administrability.
As noted in the Introduction, after RFRA was enacted, the Supreme
Court held it was invalid as applied to states, because Congress could not
override the Court’s determination of the reach of constitutional
provisions,28 although it was within the regulatory power of Congress to
limit the effective coverage of federal laws.29 Consequently, many states
have since adopted their own versions of RFRA.30
An important feature of “compelling interest” in this context, although not explicitly acknowledged by the Supreme Court, needs to be

26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
27. Id. § 2000bb(a)(5).
28. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
29. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439
(2006).
30. See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look at
State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 466 (2010) (providing overview of state RFRAs).
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recognized.31 The “compelling interest” test was developed mainly in
respect to laws that interfered with freedom of expression and disadvantaged racial minorities. In those contexts, only an extremely powerful
interest allows a government restriction to survive; the use of the test has
been close to a determination of invalidation.32 Despite some rhetorical
formulations, such a high bar has not typically been employed for
religious exemption claims. When people assert a constitutional right to
an exemption from an otherwise valid statute, they seek special treatment
not afforded to others; courts generally have not insisted on an
overpowering government interest to reject the claim—a genuine
substantial interest suffices. This was effectively sufficient in United States
v. Lee, the 1982 case in which the Supreme Court rejected the claim of an
Amish employer not to pay the Social Security Tax, and it was also
reﬂected in a wide variety of lower court decisions dealing with religious
claims.33 Since RFRA explicitly adopted the approach taken prior to
Employment Division v. Smith and refers to the federal courts’ test as
“striking sensible balances,” the statute did not seek to greatly increase
the rigor of what the government needed to show.34 Thus, its use of the
“compelling interest” standard needs to be understood as a kind of intermediate scrutiny, more rigorous than “rational basis” but less than the
demanding test used to invalidate laws effecting racial discrimination or
interfering with core forms of protected speech.
In seeking to discern the scope of any statutory language, one may
focus on legislative intent or reader understanding or both. In contrast
31. Although not actually acknowledging what follows, the Court has also not denied it.
32. Among the accounts of this use of the text are chapters 9 (Freedom of Speech
and the Press) and 12 (Equal Protection) in Greenawalt, Interpreting, supra note 5, at
195–241, 336–68. How the test works for free exercise claims is treated in id. at 263–76 and
in much more detail in 1 Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution: Free Exercise
and Fairness, 201–32 (2006) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Religion and Constitution].
33. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (“Congress and the courts have
been sensitive to the needs ﬂowing from the Free Exercise Clause, but every person
cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising every aspect of the right to
practice religious beliefs.”). This conclusion is supported with reference to a variety of
cases in Greenawalt, Religion and Constitution, supra note 32, at 216–28 (examining cases
in which courts were called on to balance interferences with religious exercise against
degrees of government need, ranging from prisoners’ appearance to bankruptcy). Two
other cases in which the Supreme Court rejected religious claims were Bob Jones
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602–05 (1983), and Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986). In the ﬁrst of these, the Court did not allow a religious university
that engaged in a form of racial discrimination to maintain its tax-exempt status as a
charity. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605. Of course, the effort to combat racial
discrimination could well count as compelling even in the strongest sense. In the second
case, the Court held that a military rule against wearing headgear could apply even to an
Orthodox Jewish psychologist at a mental health clinic. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509–10. The
military interest here seems far from compelling, but for this decision—made four years
before Smith—most Justices were simply disinclined to sustain a religious claim to violate a
general regulation.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2012).
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to some decades ago, when large attention was given to legislative history
as showing enactor intent, the Supreme Court’s main focus now is often
on how a reader would understand statutory language.35 Despite huge
complexities in exactly what “readers” should count, and the clear fact
that with directive language, people understand what is communicated
in terms of what they perceive writers or speakers as trying to convey,36
most of the majority joining Alito’s opinion placed primary weight on
readers, and not on enactors.37 That is the gist of this opinion as well,
although it does not explicitly discount the actual intent of members of
Congress as irrelevant, and, given what it asserts, the distinction is not
central to the decision.
This general account of the terms of RFRA, why it was enacted, and
how both of these relate to earlier free exercise constitutional law,
provide important bases for a fairly ﬂexible interpretation in light of
overarching values.
II. APPLICATION TO CLOSELY HELD FOR-PROFIT CORPORATIONS
For Justice Alito, the primary coverage question is whether for-proﬁt
corporations count as “persons” within the statute. He relied partly on the
broad precept that within the law, generally corporations count as persons,
and partly on the Dictionary Act which provides that for acts of Congress,
“unless the context indicates otherwise . . . ‘person’ . . . include[s] corporations, companies, associations, ﬁrms, partnerships, societies, and joint
stock companies, as well as individuals.”38 Rejecting the counterargument
that the Supreme Court had never sustained the free exercise right of a
for-proﬁt corporation prior to Smith, Justice Alito relied partly on Braunfeld
v. Brown,39 although the Orthodox Jewish company that then sought an
exception from a Sunday closing law was actually not incorporated. The
Court’s rejection of that claim on the merits without expressing doubt
about standing is taken as favoring the companies in Hobby Lobby.40

35. See Greenawalt, Statutory, supra note 5, at 49–59 (describing shift in statutory
interpretation from focus on legislative intent to textualism, especially since Justice Scalia
joined Court).
36. There are, of course, various assertions about why no real intent of a legislative
body is discernible from committee reports and statements in sessions. See supra note 5
and accompanying text (citing author’s work describing realist perspective’s uncertainty
about opinions).
37. Cf. supra note 19 (discussing Justice Scalia’s opinion in NLRB v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014)).
38. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
39. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
40. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2769–70 (“In Braunfeld, we entertained the free-exercise
claims of individuals who were attempting to make a proﬁt as retail merchants, and the
Court never even hinted that this objective precluded their claims.” (citation omitted)).
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To meet the contention that “context” in the Dictionary Act would here
suggest an exception, Justice Alito responded both convincingly and
unconvincingly. He is right that reading RFRA simply to preclude recovery
by any entity that happens to be different from those winning cases prior to
Smith would be inappropriate. When courts develop a settled interpretative
approach to a broad constitutional or statutory provision, that does not foreclose appropriate coverage for a novel situation that differs from those
previously resolved. The basic standards that have been articulated may be
inconclusive or even point in favor of a new application. Justice Alito also
said, unpersuasively, that the text of RFRA does not indicate a tie to “preSmith interpretation.”41 In fact, although we do not know what the law entails
for questions of coverage not clearly settled by pre-Smith cases, RFRA is
clearly designed to reinstitute the interpretation that preceded Smith.42
Justice Alito further supported his position about the text’s coverage by
noting one pre-Smith case43 in which a majority of Justices implicitly accepted
the standing of a for-profit corporation.44 The actual strength of this
example is hardly clear. Three dissenters did vote that free exercise rights
had actually been infringed, but a plurality of four specifically reserved the
question of standing while rejecting the claim on the merits; two others
rejecting the claim did not specify a reservation about standing.45
Another argument Justice Alito made against limited coverage is the
expansion that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), adopted seven years after RFRA, made to the deﬁnition of the
“exercise of religion” in RFRA itself.46 Contrary to the dissent’s
assumption that this change did not concern who could bring claims but
merely made clear that claims might succeed without satisfying a

41. Id. at 2772.
42. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 515–16 (1997) (discussing intent of RFRA).
43. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2772–73 (“The plurality opinion for [Gallagher] rejected
the First Amendment claim on the merits based on the reasoning in Braunfeld, and reserved
decision on the question whether the corporation had ‘standing’ to raise the claim.” (citing
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 631 (1961))).
44. Of course, if RFRA did not apply to corporations like Hobby Lobby, they would
lack standing to raise a claim under it.
45. Gallagher, 366 U.S. 617 (1961). For the separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter,
released on the same day as Gallagher and joined by Justice Harlan, see McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961). For the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan,
released on the same day as Gallagher and joined by Justice Stewart, see Braunfeld, 366 U.S.
at 610–16 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion, see
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 561 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
46. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761–62. The exercise of religion was made not to
depend on “whether or not” it was “compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief” and the measure was to be “construed in favor of a broad protection of religious
exercise.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-3(g), 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012).
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centrality standard,47 Alito contended that the amendment also supports
an inclusive notion of “persons.”48
Alito further argued that, given the government’s concession that
RFRA does apply to nonproﬁt organizations, it would not make sense to
take “persons” as including some kinds of companies but not those
incorporated “for-proﬁt.”49 He pointed out that many states now explicitly
recognize hybrid corporate forms, according to which “for-proﬁt” corporations may have other objectives apart from making money, some of
which may actually reduce the likely amount of proﬁt.50 Responding to
Justice Ginsburg’s argument that it does not make sense to think of “forproﬁt” corporations as actually exercising religion,51 he urged that those
who control closed corporations are human beings who are genuinely
engaged in exercises of religion.52
47. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2792 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“RLUIPA’s
alteration clariﬁes that courts should not question the centrality of a particular religious
exercise.”).
48. He further rejected Justice Ginsburg’s assertion that the 2012 rejection by
Congress of an amendment to broadly exempt claims of conscience from the Women’s
Health Amendment, which had expanded the requirements of the Affordable Care Act,
showed an intention to restrict what entities could bring claims. Id. at 2775 n.30 (majority
opinion).
49. Id. at 2768–69.
50. Id. at 2770–71. (“While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-proﬁt
corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-proﬁt
corporations to pursue proﬁt at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so.”).
Justice Alito’s reference to so-called “beneﬁt” corporations in one respect actually cuts
against his position. While many states have authorized corporations that may pursue
objectives in addition to making proﬁts, these corporations must contain a provision in
their articles of incorporation stating that they are a beneﬁt corporation. Plainly the
corporations at issue in the case did not choose to be beneﬁt corporations, which calls into
question whether the inference Justice Alito wants to draw actually applies. Of course, the
corporations may have been created prior to the enactment of the state statutes; the
statutes do allow an existing corporation to convert to a beneﬁt corporation, but that
amendment requires at least a two-thirds vote, and a ninety percent vote in Delaware. See
Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in
Beneﬁt Corporations 14 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch., Minn. Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 14-21, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2423346 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (detailing state-speciﬁc legal rules and procedures regarding conversion to beneﬁt
corporation). At least in many circumstances, the failure of a corporation to amend its
charter in this fashion could support an inference that a signiﬁcant number of its
shareholders did not want the corporation to combine proﬁt and religion, risking a
dilution of one or both.
51. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2793–94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he exercise of
religion is characteristic of natural persons, not artiﬁcial legal entities.”).
52. Id. at 2768 (majority opinion) (“An established body of law speciﬁes the rights
and obligations of the people . . . who are associated with a corporation in one way or
another. When rights . . . are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights
of these people.”). Justice Alito suggested that the corporation’s position is sheltered by
the genuine religious beliefs of its controlling shareholders. But under standard corporate
law principles, a controlling shareholder cannot cause the corporation to take action that
beneﬁts the controlling shareholder at the expense of the minority shareholders. If,
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Although Justice Alito wrote as if the answer to the coverage question
is patently clear, in truth, if one asks what those voting for RFRA had in
mind, the almost certain answer is that they did not think about this
particular question. They were concerned with the Court’s denials of
claims in very different contexts.53 And if one turns to reader understanding, one would have to imagine an incredibly sophisticated reader to
reach the Alito resolution. An ordinary citizen simply reading RFRA could
hardly jump to the Court’s understanding. Since few people think of
business corporations as persons exercising religion, the relevant reader
for Justice Alito would need ﬁrst to understand the broader sense of
“persons” within many legal circumstances, as well as the existence and
content of the Dictionary Act. She would then need to overcome doubts
raised by the special force of RFRA as a whole, and whether its inclusion of
“a person’s exercise of religion” helps to create the “context” for an
exception under the Dictionary Act. In other words, “the reader” would
have to be exceptionally well informed or an imagined hypothetical expert
to support Alito’s treatment of the statute’s language.
Addressing these questions carefully, one must acknowledge that
neither legislative intent nor the understanding of even a very informed
reader yields a decisive answer, both because prior law did not focus on

because of his religious beliefs, a controlling shareholder is causing the corporation to
decline to provide coverage in a way that could hurt the company economically, that could
be seen as violating his ﬁduciary duty to the minority, absent a showing that the minority
unanimously agrees with him (or the corporation is a beneﬁt corporation and has
declared its religious commitment, see supra note 50). To be sure, the controlling
shareholder could take the position that not covering these contraceptive techniques is
good business, perhaps because it will attract social conservatives to buy lots of things from
the corporation, a position that if artfully presented would protect the controlling shareholder from liability under corporate law. However, establishing that position would
require a factual showing that the shareholder in fact believed that the strategy would be
proﬁtable, a position that could undercut a claim that his religious beliefs are genuine.
53. However, in an amicus brief, Douglas Laycock urged that a few years after RFRA
was passed, debates over a nonadopted religious exemption bill indicated that RFRA was
seen to cover for-proﬁt corporations. Brief of Christian Legal Society, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, et al. at 10–34, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct.
2751 (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 411294. Professor Laycock’s basic position about coverage is
challenged in James M. Oleske, Jr., Obamacare, RFRA, and the Perils of Legislative
History, 67 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 77, 82–87 (2014) http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org
/content/articles/2014/03/Oleske_Perils-of-Legislative-History.pdf [http://perma.cc/BN
5D-UQ4Z] (arguing nonadopted religious exemption bill’s legislative history does not
support coverage for for-proﬁt corporations); defended in Douglas Laycock, Imaginary
Contradictions: A Reply to Professor Oleske, 67 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 89 (2014) http://
www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/03/Laycock_Response.pdf [http://
perma.cc/67PV-BYQV] (responding to Professor Oleske’s challenge to coverage for forproﬁt corporations); and challenged again in James M. Oleske, Jr., The Public Meaning of
RFRA Versus Legislators’ Understanding of RLPA: A Response to Professor Laycock, 67
Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 125 (2014) , http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles
/2014/05/Oleske-Response.pdf [http://perma.cc/RX9W-XGKC] (defending original
challenge to Laycock’s position that RFRA covered for-proﬁt corporations).

2015]

HOBBY LOBBY

165

nor resolve this particular issue, and because the “context” exception
makes application of the Dictionary Act far from straightforward.
Given this conclusion, the issue of coverage really should come
down to whether, given the objectives of RFRA and concerns about
administrability, an extension to closely held for-proﬁt corporations is
sound. Aspects of that far from simple question could include whether
the statutory language allows any distinction (1) between closely held
corporations and other corporations, (2) between for-proﬁt corporations
and other organizations, and (3) between claims that concern government rules that are not aimed to protect existing or potential employees
and those deﬁnitely designed to provide such protection.54 The actual
text of RFRA does not contain any of these distinctions, but if “context”
and likely difficulties of administration are considered, one or more of
these ways of drawing a line could make sense.
On the issue of coverage for closely held companies, it is interesting
how the Alito opinion itself treats likely claims by publicly held
corporations such as IBM and General Electric. Continually emphasizing
that the litigants involved here are closely held corporations in which
particular families have complete control and possess religious convictions opposed to the statute’s mandate, Justice Alito said it “seems
unlikely” that publicly traded corporations will bring RFRA claims, given
the diversity of views of stockholders. He concluded that “we have no
occasion in these cases to consider RFRA’s applicability to such
companies.”55 However, imagine a company that lies somewhere between
closely held corporations and those in which widely diverse shareholders
hold a majority of stocks. One family, or a group of close religious
associates could hold onto a bare majority of shares, making only a
minority actually available for purchase by those with divergent views.
The main stockholders could certainly feel that a requirement violates
their religious convictions, and they might well be willing to reduce
slightly the value of their stocks by not complying. For an ordinary forproﬁt corporation, minority shareholders may have a legal claim if the
monetary value of their shares is sacriﬁced for other values.56 However,
that would not be true if those in control were adhering to one of the
purposes of an established hybrid corporation. It might also not be true
for an ordinary corporation if an initial contract with those buying stocks
made clear other objectives besides proﬁts. Given Justice Alito’s textual
approach to “person,” it is very hard to see how RFRA will simultaneously
54. Of course, laws protecting employees can play a role even when they do not
present the fundamental issue at stake. Thus, Employment Division v. Smith concerned
unemployment compensation, but the basic controversy was whether ingesting peyote as
the center of a worship service could be criminal. 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
55. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2774.
56. See James D. Cox & Thomas Lee Hazen, Business Organizations Law § 14.15, at
437–38 (3d ed. 2011) (detailing various state decisions recognizing ﬁduciary duty of
“utmost good faith and care” to minority shareholders in closely held corporations).
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include closely held for-proﬁt corporations and exclude all publicly
traded corporations, and religious exercise claims may well be made by
those who control certain varieties of the latter.
The problem of different views among stockholders can, of course,
arise even in closely held corporations when family members have
competing views. In such circumstances, administrators and courts will
need to decide who can speak for the corporation on the issue of
religious conviction. This Part has indicated why it may not be at all
simple to draw a line between closely held and other for-proﬁt corporations and why the statute’s reaching of the former is far from obvious.
This reality should have underlain an approach to this issue that took
account of how well such applications would work in general in
furthering the purposes of RFRA.
III. SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN
Having resolved that “person” within RFRA includes closely held forproﬁt corporations, Justice Alito turned to whether requiring insurance
coverage for employees to use the four contraceptive devices constituted
a “substantial burden” on the owners’ exercise of religion.57 None of the
Justices doubted that the owners’ sincere religious convictions conceived
these contraceptives as sometimes taking innocent life. Given that actual
sincerity was not in question, how was one to determine if the burden was
“substantial”? On this the Alito and Ginsburg opinions sharply disagreed;
neither explored some nuances that could have made a difference in this
respect. Among other things, Justice Alito discounted the conceivable
relevance of United States v. Lee.58 In that predecessor to Smith, the Court,
as Alito noted, did assume a substantial burden on religious exercise,
relying instead on the absence of a less restrictive means to sustain the
application of the Social Security tax law as it applied to an Amish
employer.59 But one might see the Lee case, and other possible claims for
tax exemptions, as actually supporting Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting
argument that when a connection to a practice to which one objects
becomes too attenuated, that should not count as a substantial burden.60
As developed below, the payment of taxes may be seen both as a
connection that is not sufficiently direct and as somewhat similar to
insurance coverage.61
In discerning a substantial burden in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito relied
essentially on two factors—the owners’ sincerity that providing the
insurance would seriously violate their religious beliefs and the powerful
57. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
58. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
59. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770.
60. Id. at 2797–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
61. See infra notes 76–81 and accompanying text (presenting payment of taxes as
analogy).
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adverse economic consequences that a violation would impose on
them.62 More speciﬁcally, if companies failed to include the required
items in their insurance, they would be taxed $100 per day for each
person; if they dropped insurance coverage altogether, they would be
penalized $2000 per employee per year, as long as at least one employee
was eligible for a subsidy on a government-run exchange.63 In answer to
the assertion by amici supporting the government that the penalty for
dropping coverage completely would not be more expensive than
providing it,64 Justice Alito noted initially that the Court should not reach
an empirical claim raised for the ﬁrst time at this stage of the litigation,
but he proceeded to announce that the argument was “unpersuasive.”65
His reason was that if a company failed to provide valuable insurance, it
would need to raise wages to compensate, a raise for which, in contrast to
insurance beneﬁts, employees would have to pay taxes.66 Although the
exact economic consequence of the $2000 penalty could depend on the
size of the company and whether at least one employee was eligible for a
government subsidy, Justice Alito’s conclusion, that the overall economic
consequences would generally be negative for companies that paid the
penalty and compensated their workers for failing to provide insurance,
makes sense.
A more fundamental problem concerning the practical consequences of a violation is why that should matter for whether the
requirement itself poses a substantial burden. If compliance bothered
someone only a little, his doing so would not involve a substantial burden
no matter how severe were the penalties for violations. In past cases, the
Court has assessed burdens in terms of the basic requirements, not the
penalties. Justice Alito clearly assumed that the litigating companies
would have accepted one of the prescribed penalties rather than actually
62. 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
63. The exact working of penalties is fairly complicated. See The Premium Tax Credit,
IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Affordable-Care-Act/Individuals-and-Families/The-Premium-TaxCredit [http://perma.cc/9L7W-XW8N] (last updated Sept. 29, 2015) (providing details of
premium tax credit). 42 U.S.C. § 18071 (2012) details cost-sharing calculations and 26 U.S.C.
§ 36B(c)(2)(C) (2012) outlines what qualiﬁes as an employer plan exempting the employee
from eligibility for the premium tax credit. See Health Reform for Small Business: The
Affordable Care Act Increases Choice and Saving Money for Small Businesses, The White
House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ﬁles/documents/health_reform_for_small_businesses
.pdf [http://perma.cc/6U7Z-H7ZY] (last visited Oct. 1, 2015) (explaining new Employer
Shared Responsibility provisions); Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility
Provisions Under the Affordable Care Act, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom
/Questions-and-Answers-on-Employer-Shared-Responsibility-Provisions-Under-the-AffordableCare-Act [http://perma.cc/6L3J-94NJ] (last updated May 20, 2015) (same).
64. For a prominent statement of this claim, see Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III—
There Is No “Employer Mandate”, Balkinization (Dec. 16, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-iiitheres-no-employer.html [http://perma.cc/S6RH-9RGE]
(last updated Dec. 18, 2013).
65. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2776.
66. Id. at 2776–77.
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providing the insurance. That willingness to suffer considerably helped
demonstrate the strength and intensity of their convictions. This
assumption raises a central issue about administrability and even people’s
self-conceptions.
Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court’s “decision elides entirely the
distinction between the sincerity of a challenger’s religious belief and the
substantiality of the burden placed on the challenger.”67 For her, the
latter is a legal matter, based on a more public appraisal of impairment.
She referred to Bowen v. Roy, a case in which a father’s claim against the
government using his child’s Social Security number was rejected
because that use did not interfere with his own religious practices.68
Without claiming that providing insurance coverage is exactly analogous,
Justice Ginsburg concluded that the “requirement is too attenuated to
rank as substantial.”69 A company ﬁnancing worker insurance does not
decide whether a woman will use one of these contraceptives; that is left
to her and her doctor, and the insurance company then pays for
whichever product she chooses. The employer’s connection to actual use
is simply too remote to amount to a substantial burden.
At one fundamental level, Justice Alito has the better of this
disagreement. If a company owner believes, based on religious conviction,
that use of a particular contraceptive device sometimes amounts to an
abortion that constitutes the killing of innocent human life, he may
conclude that he should not have to provide the device directly, any more
than he should have actually to perform an act with that likely consequence. He may further think that if he provides money to someone
knowing she will use it for that purpose, his involvement is still too great.
And he may even believe that providing insurance coverage that some
women will use in that way still keeps him so involved that he would rather
suffer serious penalties. If he is convinced he would somehow be involved
in taking innocent life, does that not constitute a substantial burden on his
religious exercise, determined by his religious convictions?
What the Alito approach does not adequately take into account is the
problem of administrability, partly illustrated by the comparison with
paying taxes. On the general question of administrability, a helpful analogy
of a different kind concerns the Roman Catholic belief that communion
involves an actual transformation; wine, which Jesus used during the Last
Supper in his reference to his body and blood, is regarded as a central
element. Were a bar on the use of alcohol to make no exception
whatsoever for Catholic Mass, it would be a substantial burden. Many
Protestants believe communion is essentially symbolic, that it may be
desirable to use wine, or to leave that choice to parishioners, but valid
communion can take place with grape juice. Were a law to forbid any use
67. Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. 476 U.S. 693, 701–04 (1986).
69. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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of wine, and were this law actually enforced for the small amounts given at
communion, these Protestants would use grape juice rather than suffer the
penalties for illegal use or refrain from having communion altogether. We
might well conclude that taking all this into account, an absolute, enforced
bar on using wine would certainly impose a substantial burden on Catholic
religious exercise, just as the bar on using peyote, upheld in Employment
Division v. Smith, must be understood as such a burden on the religious
exercise of members of the Native American Church.70 By contrast, the
burden on the described Protestants would be less than substantial. But
once an exemption was clearly established, how might the Protestants
respond? If they thought it would be beneﬁcial to use wine for all or some
participants, would they not be tempted to claim that since communion is
a central part of some of their worship services, the use of wine is very
important? And on reﬂecting about whether they actually warrant an
exemption, might they not persuade themselves that wine really is highly
important and genuinely come to believe that the law really does impose a
substantial burden?71 Given these kinds of possibilities, how are outsider
officials in a position to determine if a conviction is honest and really
amounts to a substantial burden?
These concerns provide signiﬁcant support for the argument that,
given the need for exemptions that are administrable, the substantiality
of a burden should be based partly on whether the connection between
the actions of a claimant and the practices to which he objects is not too
remote from a more general perspective. “Remoteness” here would need
to rest on a determination that takes account of practical difficulties and
more general public perceptions.
In supporting his conclusion about burden, Justice Alito unpersuasively relied upon Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division as “nearly identical.”72 In that case, the Court accepted a
person’s refusal to participate in making turrets for tanks, even though he
had previously helped manufacture steel that was used for weapons.73
Rejecting the state court’s odd conclusion that Thomas’s choice was not
really religious, Chief Justice Burger’s opinion did emphasize the importance of an individual’s own beliefs, but what the state court challenged
70. 494 U.S. 872, 903 (1990) (conceding “[t]here is no dispute that Oregon’s
criminal prohibition of peyote places a severe burden on the ability of respondents to
freely exercise their religion”).
71. During the Vietnam War, which many draftees perceived as unjustiﬁed, some
applied for conscientious objector exemptions, which require such an objection to
participating in “war in any form,” and many did actually arrive at this belief, although
they would almost certainly not have in other circumstances, such as World War II. See
David Malament, Selective Conscientious Objection and the Gillette Decision, in War and
Moral Responsibility 159, 160 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1974) (discussing universal
versus selective conscientious objection to war in context of Vietnam War).
72. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)).
73. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715.
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was Thomas’s consistency and his ﬁt with what other Jehovah’s Witnesses
believed, not the connection of his work to a genuine objection to war.74 In
fact, part of the controversy was whether he could sensibly take a different
perspective when his involvement became somewhat more direct, not more
attenuated.75 For these reasons, the Thomas decision does not actually
provide powerful support for the Court’s resolution in Hobby Lobby.
This brings us to the relation to tax laws. Although recognizing that
religious exercise was burdened in United States v. Lee,76 Justice Alito
decisively put aside compliance with tax laws as outside the realm of what
RFRA covers.77 By paying general taxes, individuals and companies
provide indirect support for all sorts of activities, some of which the
persons paying may ﬁnd deeply objectionable on religious grounds.
Whether one sees the reason as the absence of a substantial burden or
the existence of a compelling interest with no less restrictive means, the
Supreme Court has made clear that neither the First Amendment nor
RFRA requires exemptions from tax payments.78 Although a legislative
exemption strategy could wisely allow those with strong objections to
instead pay a higher amount of taxes which would then be used only for
purposes they accept,79 such a strategy has rarely been used and is
deﬁnitely not required by any general law.
How different is insurance coverage from tax payments, especially if
one considers the actual tax case in which a company’s claim was
rejected? United States v. Lee involved a Social Security tax, not a general
income tax. The Amish employer had only Amish workers, and the
74. See id. at 714–16 (discussing state court’s reasoning).
75. See id. at 715 (discussing lower court’s treatment of issue of directness of
Thomas’s involvement in different scenarios).
76. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770 (describing Lee’s holding as “compulsory
participation in the social security system interferes with [Amish employers’] free exercise
rights” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,
257 (1982))).
77. See id. at 2784 (“Lee was a free-exercise, not a RFRA, case, but if the issue in Lee
were analyzed under the RFRA framework, the fundamental point would be that there
simply is no less restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to pay taxes.”). It is
interesting, if peripheral in this respect, that Chief Justice Roberts, who joined the Alito
opinion, wrote for the majority in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius that
the requirement that individuals obtain health care insurance was justiﬁed under
Congress’s power to tax. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012).
78. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2784 (“Because of the enormous variety of
government expenditures funded by tax dollars, allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion
of their tax obligations on religious grounds would lead to chaos.”); Lee, 455 U.S. at 260
(“Because the broad public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high
order, religious belief in conﬂict with the payment of taxes affords no basis for resisting
the tax.”).
79. For a defense of this approach, see, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Refusals of Conscience:
What Are They and When Should They Be Accommodated?, 9 Ave Maria L. Rev. 47, 61
(2010) (suggesting government could “[l]et those opposed in conscience to paying certain
taxes pay the amount owed plus an extra amount to some other valuable endeavor”).
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Amish did not believe in accepting Social Security from the government.80 Were all the workers and their families to remain Amish, they
would never take advantage of any Social Security beneﬁts to which they
were entitled. Given the employer’s religious conviction that acceptance
of such beneﬁts was wrong, and that his payment of the tax was to
provide speciﬁcally for his workers being able to receive those beneﬁts,
his objection to payment does not seem very different from that involved
in Hobby Lobby. It is true that taxes go into a general pool, whereas
insurance coverage is for speciﬁc groups, but how much difference does
that make for whether religious exercise is substantially burdened, or
whether a less restrictive means exists? Very little, in fact. In brief, if one
sees the tax cases as possibly about what should not amount to a
“substantial burden,” independent of the individual religious convictions
of particular claimants, adopting the Ginsburg approach to assess
attenuation would be a genuine option.
Yet another option would be an intermediate approach. Judges
might rely primarily on individual convictions when these are fairly
obvious and do not extend too far in stretching connections between the
degree of involvement and the practices to which the claimants object.
However, if either individual convictions are very hard to determine or
those of particular claimants extend beyond certain reasonable limits
concerning connections, a more general sense of substantial burden
would come into play.81
This Part has offered two basic criticisms of Justice Alito’s treatment
of “substantial burden.” The opinion both fails to consider how its
approach will work for a range of RFRA claims and effectively eliminates
the burden requirement as a genuine limit on claims that can be made.
IV. COMPELLING INTEREST
Having found a substantial burden, Justice Alito turned to whether
the government’s interest in requiring the contested insurance coverage
was compelling. The opinion, after expressing some doubt, ends up with,
“We ﬁnd it unnecessary to adjudicate this issue,” instead assuming that
the government’s interest in “guaranteeing cost-free access to the four
challenged contraceptive methods” meets that standard.82 The opinion
does counter any casting of the crucial interest in very broad terms such
as “public health,” rather insisting that the “Government . . .
80. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 254–55 (noting appellee’s religious opposition to paying
social security taxes).
81. For a discussion of this troubling issue in respect to what claims of conscience
should be recognized, see Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of
Conscience, 28 J.L. & Pol. 91, 105–07 (2013) (“Requiring some closeness of connection to
the act to which one objects can be an indirect way of assuring an employee’s basic
sincerity and that his moral objection really rises to the intensity of conscience.”).
82. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780.
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demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisﬁed through
application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular
claimant.”83 This language taken from RFRA itself and from Gonzales v. O
Centro,84 which applied RFRA to the federal government, cannot be taken
quite literally. The government will often lack a compelling interest in
enforcing a restriction against one particular person or entity, so long as
it reaches everyone else. Certainly that would have been true in United
States v. Lee—Social Security taxes would hardly have been touched if Lee
alone had failed to pay. One needs to understand this standard as at least
positing that a single granted exception is not required if it will
encourage multiple claims by others, thus undermining the enforcement
of tax or other laws. More signiﬁcantly, the government has a compelling
interest in applying the law to the particular “person,” if nonenforcement against all others who are not distinguishable under RFRA
would sacriﬁce that interest.
Justice Alito’s doubt about whether a compelling interest existed for
the litigated cases relies on provisions allowing companies with fewer
than ﬁfty employees not to provide any health insurance and allowing
companies with grandfathered plans to continue to provide some health
insurance without meeting the act’s requirements.85 Justice Ginsburg’s
counterargument is that speciﬁed exceptions do not eliminate a
compelling interest and that the grandfathered exception was designed
to give companies time to bring things up to date, not to be long-lasting
in effect.86 After noting his uncertainty, Justice Alito refrained from
resolution about a compelling interest.87
Justice Ginsburg argued powerfully that contraceptives covered by
the debated insurance, notably intrauterine devices, are especially critical
to protect women’s health and freedom of choice.88 Justice Kennedy,
concurring, wrote that the “Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) makes the case that the mandate serves” a compelling interest,
83. Id. at 2779 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gonzales v. O Centro
Espirita Beneﬁcente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430–31 (2006)).
84. 546 U.S. at 430–31.
85. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780 (“As we have noted, many employees—those
covered by grandfathered plans and those who work for employers with fewer than 50
employees—may have no contraceptive coverage without cost sharing at all.”). The
opinion itself, though explaining the two bases for noncoverage, does not clearly indicate
the difference between exactly what options are available to the two categories of
companies. However, Justice Alito noted that the phasing out of grandfathered plans is not
legally required. See id. at 2764 n.10 (“[T]here is no legal requirement that grandfathered
plans ever be phased out.”).
86. See id. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Once speciﬁed changes are made,
grandfathered status ceases.”).
87. See id. at 2780 (majority opinion) (declining to adjudicate issue).
88. See id. at 2799–801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he corporations exclude
intrauterine devices (IUDs), devices signiﬁcantly more effective, and signiﬁcantly more
expensive than other contraceptive methods.”).
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and goes on to “conﬁrm” the “premise” of the Court’s opinion that such
an interest is served.89 Since Kennedy’s language is about as close as he
could get to stating explicitly that the compelling interest standard was
satisﬁed, it appears that that at least ﬁve Justices deﬁnitely believed that it
was, whatever were the doubts of Justice Alito and the remaining three
Justices joining his opinion. The combination of the opinions of Justices
Alito and Kennedy reveal that the presence or absence of a compelling
interest was not central to the decision. In some other circumstances,
that could matter for a RFRA claim. This Essay supports the view that that
should be evaluated partly in terms of the strength of the competing
religious claim and how workable its recognition will be.
V. LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS
Having assumed, without deciding, the existence of a compelling
interest, Justice Alito turned to whether denial of an exemption was the
least restrictive means. In general terms, Alito referred to least-restrictive
means standard as “exceptionally demanding.”90 This phrasing lies in
interesting contrast with the Court’s characterization of the compelling
interest test in Cutter v. Wilkinson,91 which applied RLUIPA to claims of
federal prisoners, a case Justice Alito actually used to indicate that
Congress was not bothered by difficulties of testing sincerity.92 In Cutter,
the Court stressed that context matters for the compelling interest test
and that “due deference” was to be given to prison officials about
maintaining order and safety.93 Given that prison cases often concern
whether prison officials will sacriﬁce an important interest if they
accommodate a claim, “due deference” here obviously reaches what
means will work, and is very far from any “exceptionally demanding”
legal test.
As with other aspects, Justice Alito’s opinion throws out a rather
broad possibility before resolving the case on a much narrower ground.
The broad option is that the government could itself pay for the
contraceptives without sacriﬁcing a great deal ﬁnancially.94 The narrower
ground relies on the fact that the Obama Administration had already

89. Id. at 2785–86 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 2780 (majority opinion).
91. See 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (“[A]n accommodation must be measured so that it
does not override other signiﬁcant interests.”).
92. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2761–62 (citing Cutter in comparing scope of RFRA
with that of RLUIPA).
93. 544 U.S. at 723 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2780–81 (“The most straightforward way of doing
this would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives
at issue to any omen who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies
due to their employers’ religious objections.”).
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granted an exemption for nonproﬁt religious organizations95—whatever
their form of providing employee insurance, they need not pay for
insurance for contraceptive devices whose use counters their religious
convictions.
If one of these organizations has group health insurance, the
company providing that insurance must pay for use of these contraceptive devices by those who are insured. The assumption has been that
this will not increase the cost for the insuring company itself, even if it
does not charge the religious organization more money to cover the
contraceptives, because use of these contraceptives precludes future,
more costly medical treatments for the unintended pregnancies and
birth expenses of uncovered women who would not themselves pay for
expensive intrauterine devices.
When it comes to self-insured organizations such as Notre Dame
University, however, things work differently.96 A third-party administrator
acquires the contraceptive insurance to which the organization objects
from a company that administers Federal Facilitated Exchange Insurance.
Having granted this insurance, that company is allowed to pay the
government a reduced amount for the privilege of its participation in the
federally facilitated exchange.
If this plan for independent coverage, in its two variations, will work
for religious nonproﬁt organizations, presumably it can also do so for
closely held for-proﬁt corporations. Thus, it provides an effective less
restrictive alternative to satisfy the government’s compelling interest (at
least so long as the corporation’s owners do not believe that even the
requirement that they cooperate by registering their objection in a
certain form violates their religious convictions).97
In rejecting Justice Alito’s conclusion about a less restrictive
alternative, Justice Ginsburg did not really show why the resolution in the
narrow context of the case could not satisfy the government’s interest in
insured use of the contraceptives.98 In respect to administrability, the
95. See id. at 2781–82 (“HHS has already established an accommodation for
nonproﬁt organizations with religious objections.”).
96. See id. at 2763 n.8 (discussing requirements in cases of self-insured religious
organizations entitled to accommodation).
97. This related issue was sharply raised by the Court’s order, a few days after Hobby
Lobby, not to require Wheaton College, a religious school, to submit the required exemption
form until the merits of its claim against doing so are resolved. See Wheaton Coll. v. Burwell,
134 S. Ct. 2806, 2807 (2014) (declining to condition injunction on applicant’s use of speciﬁc
form). Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, strongly dissented from this
ruling. Id at 2810 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent in
Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), it was not yet clear if the parties in
Hobby Lobby would accept ﬁling the required documents. Of course, if the particular form of
the document is somehow objectionable, it may be that a less offensive form could satisfy the
least restrictive means test.
98. She did indicate that women will have to take steps to learn about and sign up for
coverage, but it is unclear just how this works and whether it is a real impediment. See
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government has been assuming that religious organizations will not put
forward a dishonest claim, instead accepting the mere submission of the
proper notice as a basis for the exemption. Although one can imagine
occasional incentives to advance insincere claims in this context, such as
satisfying customers with a religious outlook one does not happen to
share, any concern about false claims is not major.
The Court’s particular conclusion about a less restrictive means,
persuasive though it may be in this speciﬁc circumstance, should lead to
reﬂection on the question of government payments and costs, and on
whether taxes are really so different in principle. Just how often an
insurance company will actually save money by providing a beneﬁt that the
enterprises purchasing insurance for their workers have not included is far
from clear.99 If providing an extra beneﬁt, on balance, costs the insurance
company money, it may need to raise its overall rates slightly or receive a
governmental grant. If the companies raise rates for their customers
generally to meet a RFRA need, that itself seems very close to the government imposing a modest tax to satisfy relevant religious convictions. At the
same time, the companies with the religious objections may end up paying
slightly less for their own worker insurance because they are not covering
certain practices.100 In other words, a cost would be shifted from those with
the religious conviction to a more general public.
In fact, something very close to that actually takes place with the
present scheme for self-insured religious organizations. Whatever the
overall consequences of the provision of Federally Facilitated Exchange
Insurance for workers using these contraceptive devices and their selfinsuring employers, the independent company providing the contraHobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Impeding women’s receipt of
beneﬁts ‘by requiring them to take steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new
[government funded and administered] health beneﬁt’ was scarcely what Congress
contemplated.”).
99. See, e.g., Daniel Liebman, Demand Elasticity of Contraceptives and Their CostEffectiveness, a Follow-Up, Incidental Economist (July 11, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://
theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/demand-elasticity-of-contraceptives-and-their-costeffectiveness-a-follow-up/ [http://perma.cc/E5L9-J22L] (noting contraceptive costs depend on type of method); Daniel Liebman, Does Contraceptive Coverage Pay for Itself? A
Review of the Evidence., Incidental Economist (July 9, 2014, 6:55 AM), http://
theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/does-contraceptive-coverage-pay-for-itself-a-review
-of-the-evidence/ [http://perma.cc/4KCM-CKSS] (noting contraceptive coverage might
not be cost-saving from insurer’s perspective since many women will pay out of pocket for
contraceptives).
100. In respect to the organizations with group health insurance, it is unclear now
whether they pay (1) less because of the devices not covered, (2) more because of
increased risks of pregnancy, (3) the same, because these risks are reduced by the
insurance company, or (4) the same, because there are set scales not responsive to such
subtle variations in coverage. The Guttmacher Institute, in a 2003 report, claimed that
“not covering contraceptives in employee health plans would cost employers 15–17%
more than providing such coverage.” Cynthia Dailard, The Cost of Contraceptive
Insurance Coverage, Guttmacher Report on Pub. Pol’y, Mar. 2003, at 12, 13.
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ceptive insurance does not directly save money, except by paying less to
the federal government under its contract allowing it the special status
for federally facilitated insurance. Although the government does not
directly pay for the insurance itself, it does receive less money because the
company provides it.
Given all this, perhaps it is not surprising that the Alito opinion ﬂirts
with the idea that government payment may itself amount to a relevant
less restrictive alternative.101 However, if this is so, and even if one focuses
not on government payment but its receiving less money under a
contract, why is taxation different? In United States v. Lee,102 had the
Amish employer not had to pay Social Security taxes, the government
might have had to pick up a modest bill down the road if some of the
workers or their family members left the Amish denomination and were
willing to accept government support. If the “less restrictive alternative”
may sometimes be government payment, it is hard to see why either
government payment to counter the negative consequences of a refusal
to pay insurance, or a reduction in government income because a
separate private company provides the insurance, is very different from
government funding to compensate for a refusal to pay a tax that is
imposed for a speciﬁc purpose, such as Social Security. Since Lee was
decided prior to Smith and RFRA and Lee raised relatively few objections,
we must assume that readers and enactors did not take the language of
RFRA to indicate a contrary result, a point all the Hobby Lobby opinions
take for granted.103
The foregoing analysis indicates why what should have been crucial
in Hobby Lobby was how its distinctive facts related to broader classes of
situations. If the particular “less restrictive” means available here is not
typically feasible more generally, perhaps it makes more sense simply to
say that when what is involved are beneﬁts for workers that cost money,
for-proﬁt companies, closely held or not, must comply with the law, unless
the legislature chooses to grant a particular exemption.104 In other words,
the general language of RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause would not
101. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781–82 (“HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at
its disposal an approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund
contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs.”).
102. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
103. Justice Ginsburg’s dissent notes that passages in Lee suggested that companies
engaged in commercial activity should not be able to superimpose their religious views on
statutory schemes or impose them on their employees. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2803–04
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104. Often, statutory provisions, such as Title VII, that allow some religious
organizations to use religious criteria for employment are not taken to include typical forproﬁt corporations. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340–46
(1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting why nonproﬁt organizations
may be exempt); see also Fike v. United Methodist Children’s Home, Inc., 547 F. Supp.
286, 290 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff’d, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding United Methodist
Children’s Home is “Methodist only in name” and not eligible for exemption).
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then be taken to provide protection. One might reasonably say that if
those in charge of a company choose incorporation—which not only
entails nondiscrimination in hiring on religious grounds but also means
that the individuals in control are not personally liable if the company
suffers a ﬁnancial disaster—it is appropriate to conclude that the owners
sacriﬁce the ability to make RFRA claims for religious objections to
requirements designed to protect their workers, many or most of whom
will not share their religious outlooks.
On top of this concern is the genuine worry that once exemptions
are granted, individuals and companies with what are actually weaker
convictions may well be inclined to claim the same special treatment.
There are thus strong practical reasons in support of concluding that
RFRA does not protect for-proﬁt corporations, closely held or not, from
requirements designed to preclude disadvantages to present employees
and discriminations of various sorts including hiring.105
This Part has urged strongly that what counts as a “less restrictive
means” should not be limited to an isolated circumstance but include
consideration of how that will work more generally. The more important
point, however, is the general theme of this Essay: namely that this
standard and the others need to be considered as related to each other,
and assessed in terms of what will serve the values reﬂected in the statute.
CONCLUSION
If the more comprehensive and context-oriented analysis offered in
this Essay had been employed, rather than application of single
standards, such as the meaning of “a person’s exercise of religion,” the
substantiality of a particular burden, or the presence of an unusual “less
restrictive means,” the conclusion of coverage or noncoverage could have
been reached only on the basis of a range of considerations. By contrast,
the Alito opinion treats each standard as a distinct legal box not
connected to the others in play. The difference between formalist treatment of individual segments and a more context-oriented approach to
what Justices must decide represents a crucial variation in approach to
open-ended statutes like RFRA.
This Essay does not address statutes with rather speciﬁc provisions
that are clear in their implications for circumstances. There, the job of
judges is to apply the law whether or not they agree with the legislative
policy. But here, matters are much more complex. If one believes that
taking everything relevant into account, RFRA coverage should not have
been granted, one could think the best result would have been
nonapplication of “a person’s exercise,” the absence of substantial
105. Interestingly, the result in Lee could be defended as helping to counter hiring
discrimination in favor of Amish workers, since other workers would want and need Social
Security protection.
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burden, or a more relaxed less restrictive means approach that treated
this like a tax case. Or one could rely on each of these grounds (as in
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent). But whatever the stated textual basis, the true
ground of resolution would rely on multiple factors that could bear on
the proper coverage of all these three criteria of RFRA. As emphasized,
that approach has special force for this particular law, which was
designed to reintroduce a preexisting constitutional standard that was
itself deﬁnitely being applied in a manner that was responsive to
administrability in particular kinds of circumstances.106
In the context of the Hobby Lobby issues and others in which
administrability is a crucial factor, it would not be desirable for the
Supreme Court, having arrived at a balanced assessment of the kinds of
circumstances in which a statute should apply, to also set ﬂexible legal
standards that are open-ended for every application. Rather, the Court
should use general considerations to set more speciﬁc criteria for who
can make claims and in what circumstances. Such an analysis might well
lead to the general conclusion that for-proﬁt companies should not get
religious exemptions under broadly worded statutes such as RFRA or
when such exemptions will interfere with rights afforded to others or
with serious concerns about practical or symbolic discrimination.
Although this Essay suggests such a conclusion, that is, of course, not
its main theme. The main claim is that formalistic, section-by-section,
reading is not really appropriate for this kind of statute. Instead, the
Supreme Court should consider sections as related to each other and
decide in terms of what will both serve the law’s objectives and be
genuinely administrable.

106. This assertion is supported by the range of cases addressed in Greenawalt,
Religion and Constitution, supra note 32, at 216–28 (examining cases in which courts were
called on to balance interferences with religious exercise against degrees of government
need, ranging from prisoners’ appearance to bankruptcy); and using that kind of
approach for many constitutional issues, including religious ones, is defended in a
forthcoming book on constitutional interpretation, Greenawalt, Interpreting, supra note 5
at 3–104, 242–81 (defending general approach involving multiple interpretive criteria and
applying approach to religion clause cases).

